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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Because
misdemeanor
jurisdiction.

this

appeal

prosecution,
UTAH CODE ANN.

is
the

from
Utah

the

final

Court

judgment

of

Appeals

in

a
has

§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 1996) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the trial judge correctly suppress evidence by
ruling that the arresting officer conducted an illegal search by
inserting his head into the compartment of a vehicle?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correction of Error. "[T]his court will
not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. . . .

In reviewing a trial court's conclusions

of law, however, we apply a correction of error standard."
v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah App. 1992); see

also

State

State v.

Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992); State v. Stewart, 806 P.2d
213, 215 (Utah App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution amend. IV
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1995)
RULES
There are no procedural rules at issue in this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the trial judge's suppression of evidence
that led to dismissal of a DUI charge against Appellee, Randy
Burton (Burton).

The trial judge held that the arresting officer

conducted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution by inserting part of his head

into the

compartment of Appellee's vehicle, and suppressed all evidence
including field sobriety tests.

Without the suppressed evidence,

the DUI charge was dismissed.

The trial judge suppressed the

evidence

based

on

an

incorrect

interpretation

of

the

Fourth

Amendment.

RELEVANT FACTS
On February 15, 1996, Burton was arrested and charged with
violating §§ 41-6-44 and 41-6-117 of the Utah Code, driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI), and operating an unsafe vehicle.
Burton was stopped because he was driving late at night without

2

headlights.
Suppress,

(See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to

West

8) (hereinafter

Valley

City

"Transcript") .

v. Burton,

Case

no. 96502627

at

As part of the stop, Officer James

L. Schmidt ("Schmidt") approached the driver's side window and spoke
to Burton.

From outside of the window, Schmidt detected the odor

of alcohol on Burton's breath.

(Transcript at 12, 14, 27, and 32) .

Because the officer was taller than the vehicle, he bent over to
see and hear Burton more clearly.

(Transcript at 10-11).

Schmidt

testified that he attempted to lean closer to Burton, and may have
inserted part of head into the vehicle.

(Transcript at 12-13).

Schmidt ordered Burton out of the car and performed field sobriety
tests.

The tests confirmed that Burton was intoxicated, so Schmidt

placed him under arrest.
Burton moved to suppress the field sobriety tests and his
arrest, on the basis that they were obtained as a result of an
illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.

Burton argued that Schmidt conducted an illegal

search when he apparently inserted part of his head
vehicle compartment.

(Transcript at 26).

into the

The court considered

testimony from Schmidt and also viewed a videotape of the stop.1
On the videotape, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.
The trial judge found that the officer had inserted a portion of
his head into Burton's vehicle, but also held that the officer had
a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated
1

A video camera was installed in the officer's patrol car,
and all traffic stops were videotaped.
3

prior to inserting his head into the vehicle.

The judge ruled that

the Fourth Amendment prohibited Schmidt from inserting a portion of
his head into the vehicle, and so he suppressed the evidence.
(Transcript at 33-34).

The exclusion of the evidence prevented

prosecution of the DUI charge.

(Transcript at 38-39).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFICER DID NOT CONDUCT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH,
BECAUSE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS INVESTIGATION
TO QUICKLY CONFIRM OR DISPEL REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

The officer did not conduct an unreasonable search because his
reasonable
justified

articulable
further

suspicion

that

investigation.

The

Burton
trial

was

intoxicated

judge

found

that

Officer Schmidt had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton
was drunk when he detected the odor of alcohol on the outside of
Burton's vehicle.

The trial judge also found that Schmidt had this

reasonable suspicion before inserting any part of his head into the
vehicle.
further

This suspicion allowed Schmidt to diligently pursue a
investigation which quickly dispelled or confirmed the

suspicion.

Officer Schmidt quickly confirmed that Burton had been

drinking heavily by smelling his breath.

This quickly confirmed

the officer's suspicions.

In addition, smelling Burton's breath

was

investigation

within

the

scope of

justified

by

Schmidt's

reasonable articulable suspicions.
II.

EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE THE OFFICER
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT SOBRIETY TESTS AND
ARREST BURTON WITHOUT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
THE "SEARCH."

Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the officer still had
4

probable cause to require field sobriety tests and arrest Burton
based

on

Evidence

information obtained
ordinarily

subject

independently

to

the

from the "search."

exclusionary

rule

may

be

admissible if police had a legitimate, independent source for the
discovery.

The trial judge found that Officer Schmidt had a

reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated prior
to inserting any part of his head into the vehicle.
Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.

Furthermore,

This alone gave the

officer probable cause to require field sobriety tests and arrest
Burton.

The so-called "search" did not affect the admissibility of

that evidence.
III. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD
SOBRIETY TESTS AND BURTON'S ARREST SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT OBTAINED FROM
THE "SEARCH."
Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the field sobriety tests
and Burton's arrest were admissible because they were not obtained
because of the "search."

The exclusionary rule only prohibits

evidence obtained through exploitation of an illegal search.
field

The

sobriety tests and the arrest were not obtained by the

"search."

The

trial

judge

found

that

Officer

Schmidt

had

a

reasonable articulable suspicion prior to inserting his head into
the vehicle, so the officer was justified in requiring the sobriety
tests.

Furthermore, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.

In short, the "search" yielded no new evidence, so there is no
evidence to suppress.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFICER DID NOT CONDUCT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH,
BECAUSE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS INVESTIGATION
TO QUICKLY CONFIRM OR DISPEL REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

The officer did not conduct an unreasonable search because his
reasonable

articulable

suspicion

that

justified further means of investigation.

Burton

was

intoxicated

The Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures."

U.S.

CONST,

amend. IV.

However, the Constitution only

prohibits unreasonable searches, not all searches.

State v. Lopez f

873 P.2d

1127, 1131

(Utah 1994); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9

(1968) .

Since Schmidt's alleged search was reasonable under the

circumstances, it does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
The "search" was reasonable because Schmidt was justified both
in stopping Burton and detaining him.

"To determine whether a

search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual
inquiry:

(1) Was the police officer's action "justified at its

inception'? and (2) Was the resulting detention "reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place'?"

Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1131-32 {quoting

Terry,

392

U.S. at 19-20) . As to the first inquiry, there is no question that
the stop was legitimate. The officer testified that he initially
stopped

Burton because

headlights.
that offense.

he was driving

late

at

night

with

no

(Transcript at 8) . Burton eventually pled guilty to
(Transcript at 39). Thus, the stop was legitimate,

6

and the officer's action was justified at its inception. 2
The

detention

was

reasonable

because

articulable suspicions that Burton was drunk.

the

officer

had

A routine traffic

stop is ordinarily limited to "the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible."

Lopez,

873 P. 2d at 1132/ see

also

Terry,

392 U.S. at 19-20; State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.
1990) (other citations omitted) . However, the limits of such a stop
expand when an officer has reasonable articulable suspicions that
a more serious crime has been committed. "Investigative questioning
that

further detains the driver must be supported by

suspicion of more serious criminal activity.

reasonable

Reasonable suspicion

means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the
stop."

Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted).

The trial judge concluded that the officer had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated, because, as the
officer obtained the necessary information pursuant to the stop, he
detected the odor of alcohol.

Significantly, the judge held that

Schmidt detected the odor prior to inserting a portion of his head
into the vehicle. (Transcript at 32, 3 4 ) .

On the videotape of the

stop, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.

Therefore,

the officer was justified in further investigation to determine the

2

"[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping
a vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence."
Lopez
873 P. 2d at 1132; See
also
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); State v. Talbot, 792
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990).
7

extent of Burton's intoxication.
The officer's investigation was reasonable, because it quickly
confirmed the suspicion that Burton had been drinking heavily.

"If

reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise,
the

scope

""diligently

of

the

stop

is

still

limited.

The

[pursue] a means of investigation that

confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly
P.2d

at 1132; quoting

App.

1991);

see

also

officers

[is] likely to
Lopez,

873

133, 136

(Utah

. . . .'"

State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d

must

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686

(1985) .
The officer quickly confirmed his suspicion that the alcohol
odor emanated from Burton by moving his head closer to Burton, and
smelling the air around him.

In so doing, a small portion of the

officer's head may have briefly entered the vehicle's window.

This

action was not a search, but the officer's diligent pursuit of a
legitimate

investigation

suspicions quickly.

that

Because

would

confirm

or

dispel

it quickly confirmed the

his

suspicion

that Burton was drunk, the action was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
Furthermore, the "search" was within the scope of the permitted
investigation.

As has been stated, the trial judge concluded that

Officer Schmidt detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting a
portion of his head into the vehicle.

(Transcript at 3 2 ) .

The

presence of the odor was a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Burton was drunk.

(Transcript at 34) .

8

Burton also volunteered

that he was drunk.

Because of that suspicion, the officer could

have ordered Burton out of the vehicle, performed sobriety tests,
or obtained breath and blood samples.

The officer could also bring

his head closer to Burton to confirm the extent of the odor, and to
determine if sobriety tests were appropriate.
therefore

reasonable, because

The "search" was

it was within the scope of the

investigation that the officer could have conducted.
To conclude, Officer Schmidt did not conduct an unreasonable
"search" by slightly inserting a portion of his head into Burton's
vehicle.

The trial judge found that Schmidt had a reasonable

articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk prior to inserting any
part of his head into the vehicle.
admitted that he was drunk.
further,

provided

confirmed

or

confirmed

that

the

dispelled

Burton's breath.

Burton

Furthermore, Burton voluntarily

The officer was allowed to investigate

investigation
the
had

was

suspicion.
been

drinking

diligent
The

and

quickly

officer

quickly

heavily

by

smelling

Since this was within the allowable scope of the

officer's investigation, and quickly confirmed his suspicion, the
"search" was reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment was not violated.
The evidence should therefore have been admitted.

II.

EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE THE OFFICER
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT SOBRIETY TESTS AND
ARREST BURTON WITHOUT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
THE "SEARCH."

Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the officer still had
probable cause to conduct field sobriety tests and arrest Burton.
"[Ejvidence which would be subject to the exclusionary rule may be
9

admissible if the police had an "independent source' for discovery
of the evidence."
App.

1988); see

(1984) .

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293

also

(Utah

Segura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796, 799

Since the officer had probable cause independent of any

"search" he may have conducted by inserting his head
vehicle,

the

field

sobriety

tests

and

Burton's

trial

judge

into the

arrest

are

admissible.
As

has

been

stated,

the

found

that

Schmidt

detected the odor of alcohol from Burton before he inserted his
head and supposedly "searched" the vehicle by smelling the air near
Burton's

mouth.

(Transcript

at

32-33).

The

trial

judge

specifically stated that the presence of the odor outside of the
vehicle constituted a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton
was drunk.

(Transcript at 34). Thus, before any alleged "search,"

the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Burton was drunk, and
could have required field sobriety tests.

(Transcript at 33).

As shown on the videotape, Burton voluntarily admitted that he
was drunk.

Thus, before the officer inserted his nose or any other

portion of his body into the vehicle, Burton stated that he was
drunk.
Burton.

This alone gave the officer probable

cause

to arrest

In other words, even if the "search" was unreasonable,

Burton's voluntary admission, which did not derive from the alleged
"search," was more than enough probable cause for the officer to
conduct sobriety tests and arrest Burton.
the

arrest

unreasonable

are

justified

from

evidence

"search," they are therefore
10

Because the tests and
independent
admissible

of

any

under

the

independent source doctrine.3
In conclusion, the field sobriety tests and Burton's arrest
did not derive from the alleged "search" of Burton's vehicle.

The

officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton had been
drinking prior to inserting any part of his head into the vehicle.
Furthermore, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk.

This

information was obtained independent of the alleged "search," and
is thus admissible.
government

Suppression of evidence should not "put the

in a worse position, because the police would have

obtained the evidence if no misconduct had taken place."
756 P.2d at 1294; see

also

Northrup,

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444

(1984) .
III. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD
SOBRIETY TESTS AND BURTON'S ARREST SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT OBTAINED FROM
THE "SEARCH."
Even if the alleged "search" was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the evidence of the field sobriety tests and Burton's
arrest should not have been suppressed because it was not obtained
from the "search."

The exclusionary rule only suppresses "evidence

obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution.

3

The trial judge rejected the argument that the officer's
reasonable suspicion was obtained independent of any alleged
"search," and thus the field sobriety tests were justified. At the
hearing, the City prosecutor argued that the evidence was
admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. The argument made
is more correctly the independent source doctrine. (Transcript at
35-37) .
11

.

. ."

(1961).4

Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655

Thus,

the

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of only the evidence
obtained

because

the officer

inserted

his

head

into

Burton's

vehicle.
The trial judge found that the officer detected the odor of
alcohol

before

he

inserted

his

head

into

Burton's

vehicle.

Therefore, the officer formed a reasonable articulable suspicion
that

Burton

was

drunk

without

any

questionable

addition, Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk.
officer
Burton's

obtained

no

vehicle.

new

evidence

by

inserting

At most, the action merely

Schmidt had already discovered.

search.

In

In short, the
his

head

into

confirmed

what

Since the "search" yielded no new

evidence, there is no evidence to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

trial

judge

improperly

granted

Burton's

motion

to

suppress, because there was no unreasonable search of Burton's
vehicle.

The arresting officer stopped Burton for operating a

vehicle at night without headlights.

The trial judge found that

the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his
head into the vehicle to confirm that Burton had alcohol on his
breath.

The officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that

Burton was drunk, which allowed the officer to pursue a means of

4

See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963) (stating that evidence is excluded only if it was obtained
"by exploitation of [the] illegality . . . ." Id.) .
12

investigation that would quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion.
Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1131-32.
The officer quickly confirmed that Burton had been drinking

heavily by smelling the air near him.

This was within the scope of

his investigation, because the officer could have requested that
Burton exit the vehicle and perform sobriety tests, or required
breath and blood samples.

Since the investigation was within the

officer's permitted authority, and since it quickly confirmed the
suspicion that Burton was drunk, the "search" was reasonable and did
not offend the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, even if the alleged "search" was unreasonable, the
field sobriety tests and arrest of Burton are admissible.

The

officer could have required the sobriety tests and arrested Burton
based on the odor of alcohol and Burton's voluntary admission that
he

was

drunk.

The

officer

obtained

that

information

inserting a portion of his head into the vehicle.

before

Since the

officer had probable cause to require the tests and make the arrest
independent of any information obtained from inserting his head
into Burton's vehicle, the evidence was admissible.

Northrup,

756

P.2d at 1293.
Finally, the only evidence that should have been suppressed
was that obtained by the officer from inserting his head into the
vehicle.

As has been stated, the trial judge held that the officer

had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk before
the officer inserted his head into the vehicle.
Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk.
13

In addition,

This evidence was not

obtained because the officer inserted his head into the vehicle,
and was more than enough probable cause for the officer to require
sobriety tests and arrest Burton.

The officer obtained no new

evidence from inserting his head into the vehicle, so no evidence
should be suppressed because of it.
Sun,

Mapp,

367 U.S. at 655; Wong

371 U.S. at 444.
For these reasons, the trial judge incorrectly concluded that

the evidence of the field sobriety tests and Burton's arrest should
be suppressed.
reverse

the

West Valley City respectfully asks that the Court

trial

judge's

decision

and

remand

the

case

prosecution.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of November, 1996.
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